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Abstract: 
This paper proposes to investigate anti-corruption campaigns in rural 
Rajasthan, India. Local claims against corruption in India are 
increasingly being articulated through the register of law, leading 
consequently to the advancement of ideals of governance as set 
forward by the state. With the recent enactment of the national Right to 
Information Act (RTI) in 2005, India has legally sanctioned the 
enforcement of administrative transparency and accountability. I argue 
that the institutionalisation of anti-corruption is inextricably 
intertwined with neoliberal principles of good governance. My study of 
village based anti-corruption campaigns is an attempt to investigate 
the local and unanticipated manifestations that emerge out of the 
technical policies on good governance.  
In this paper I use the case study of anti-corruption public hearings - 
known in Hindi as jan sunwais - in rural parts of Rajasthan, India. Jan 
sunwais are typically organised in villages in which a scam is 
suspected regarding the (non-) implementation of a government-
sanctioned development project. By employing an eclectic mix of state 
laws, particularly the RTI, and local norms of justice in a jan sunwai, 
rural populations publicly call corrupt local government officials to 
account.  
With demands for transparency and accountability being the guiding 
objective and ambition of a jan sunwai process, they starkly resemble 
principles that guide agendas of good governance. Within a jan sunwai 
citizens take it upon themselves to correct state malpractices and to 
enforce ethical standards of governance. In this manner, they resemble 
social audits and contingently show parallels to principles of 
neoliberal political agendas. 
In the paper I argue that although jan sunwais may echo neoliberal 
principles, in practice good governance comes to expression in 
multiple and unanticipated forms. Invocations of conceptual notions 
such as good governance, participatory democracy, transparency and 
accountability are not simply products of top-down interventions and 
discourses, but are creatively crafted into socio-cultural contexts. Jan 
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sunwais, with their aspiration for transparency and accountability, 
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Introduction 
  In the contemporary development discourse, anti-corruption reforms make up 
a core component within the proclamations for good governance. By combining 
economic reforms with institutional and political revisions, agendas of good 
governance foreground notions of efficiency, accountability and transparency. In this 
equation, corruption is viewed as one of the principal causes of impaired social and 
economic development and, thus, as the antithesis of the good governance ethos. 
Leading international institutions, most notably the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and Transparency International, prescribe a set of technical 
prerequisites as the panacea to many deficiencies and irregularities within public 
institutions. In consequence, anti-corruption incentives are taking root throughout 
the world falling under the overarching framework of good governance. 
 
 In this paper I examine anti-corruption campaigns in rural parts of Rajasthan, 
India. In India, local claims against corruption are increasingly being articulated 
through the register of state law. This legalization of claims is largely a result of the 
Right to Information Act (RTI), enacted in 2005, that legally sanctions the 
enforcement of administrative transparency and accountability at the national level. 
Implementation of the RTI is regarded as a major steppingstone in the government’s 
attempt to counter widespread institutional corruption. Since its enactment, 
numerous government incentives and civil society initiatives have emerged, aiming 
to strengthen and advance the RTI throughout the nation. Particularly in rural areas 
where state laws remain largely unknown to local populations, endeavours are 
carried out by civil society organizations to raise awareness and efficacy of the RTI.  
 
 The case studies I draw on in this research are anti-corruption public hearings 
– known in Hindi as jan sunwais – in rural parts of Rajasthan. Jan sunwais are 
typically organized in villages in which a scam is suspected regarding the (non-) 
implementation of a government-sanctioned development project. By applying the 
RTI law, civil society activists and villagers attain all the documents related to the 
government project and thereby collectively probe and, if evidence is found, 
adjudicate the particular case of corruption. By employing an eclectic mix of state 
laws and local norms of justice in a jan sunwai, rural populations publicly call 
corrupt local government officials to account.  
 
 The objective of this study is to examine the extent to which demands for 
transparency and accountability of a jan sunwai process fall within the purviews of 
good governance agendas. As will be elaborated further below, good governance 
relies on self-reliant and self-managing citizens who bring forward ideals of 
participation, accountability, transparency, openness, the rule of law, effectiveness 
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and efficiency. Participants of a jan sunwai arguably conform to these prerequisites 
in that they take it upon themselves to correct state malpractices and to enforce 
ethical standards of governance. By monitoring and managing the effectiveness of 
duties and responsibilities of state actors, citizens engage in processes that parallel 
those of financial auditing.   
 
 In the paper I argue that although principles that guide a jan sunwai may echo 
standards of good governance as set by transnational institutions, in practice these 
benchmarks come to expression in multiple and unanticipated forms. Local 
manifestations of global aspirations do not neatly represent the sanitized version as 
held at the discursive level, nor are they simply products of top-down interventions 
and discourses. Instead, conceptual notions such as good governance, participatory 
democracy, transparency and accountability are creatively crafted into socio-cultural 
contexts. In a jan sunwai, claims for good governance are articulated against corrupt 
local officials in a culturally specific register that negotiates and translates 
transnational standards of good governance. I call this process the ‘vernacularization’ 
of institutional anti-corruption initiatives. 
 
Right to Information: institutionalizing anti-corruption 
 The Right to Information has been acclaimed to be a revolutionary step 
towards the solidification of democracy in India. It sustains the participation of 
citizens in the governance of the country and thereby extends democracy’s 
paramount principles of openness and transparency. With the RTI in place, anti-
corruption is institutionalized and systematized at the national level. 
 
 Until the landmark day of 15 June 2005, official information of the 
government of India had been kept in obscurity under the draconian Official Secrets 
Act 1923, dating back to the colonial era. This Act, together with various other 
regulatory laws (such as the Indian Evidence Act – relating to the admissibility of 
evidence in courts) had been enacted by the British powers in order to prohibit 
disclosure of official records and to thus protect the executive powers in the name of 
security of the State and sovereignty of the nation.  
 
 On the aforesaid 15 June 2005 the Parliament of India passed a law that 
would put an end to this antiquated Act that had hitherto perpetuated the veil of 
government secrecy, and in its place the national Right to Information Act was 
enacted.  With this progressive Act in force, any citizen can now legally claim access 
to official government information, which, Section 1(f) of Chapter 1 of the RTI Act 
defines extensively as “any material in any form, including records, documents, 
memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, 
contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form 
and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public 
authority under any other law for the time being in force”. Exemption from 
disclosure is limited to information that is deemed to “prejudicially affect the 
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic 
interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence” 
(Section 8 (1) a), Chapter 2). 
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 Provisions within the Right to Information Act include the compulsory 
proviso to allow the general public to obtain any information without being 
“required to give any reason for requesting the information” (Sub-section 2, Section 
6, Chapter 2). Failure to provide the information within 30 days results in the 
monetary penalization of the bureaucrat in question. All provisions aim to make 
information easily accessible to citizens and to thus ensure that bureaucrats at the 
various echelons of the state apparatus are made to comply with the new official 
doctrine of transparency and accountability.  
 The expansiveness of the RTI implies that it can be employed in innumerable 
contexts, meeting myriad ends. Particularly in villages, the RTI is being used as a 
means to track funding and expenditures of government money intended for rural 
development. Through a wide range of schemes and programmes targeting poverty, 
the central and state governments allocate large sums of money for rural 
development. It is common knowledge, however, that funding for the various 
schemes is embezzled as it filters down along the bureaucratic line, with only a 
diluted sum reaching the supposed beneficiaries. With the RTI in force, people are 
now, in theory, in the position to seek information regarding the provisions provided 
by the various government schemes to their local area and to track down the related 
expenditures. The RTI allows the beneficiaries themselves to scrutinize and assess 
the effective implementation of government development projects administered in 
their name.  
 
 The RTI indisputably has potentially transformative consequences for citizens 
who, with this act in force, are no longer rendered complacent victims of arcane and 
abstruse policies. Despite its progressive nature, nonetheless, it has been argued that 
the RTI is a tool used mainly by the middle classes and that awareness of this law 
remains largely absent from rural areas. A study by PriceWaterhouseCooper in 2009 
shows that only 13% of rural populations, in contrast to 33% of urban populations, 
knew about the RTI (Bhalla 2010).  
 
Anti-corruption public hearings 
 Even if, on rare occasions, rural populations are aware of the RTI, they will 
generally not have access to the resources needed to use this law, such as confidence 
to speak up against the local officials or technical skills to decipher the official 
information. An effective method to demystify the well intended but arcane RTI Act 
is by means of a jan sunwai process. Jan sunwais are public hearing forums in which 
local communities are the principle actors in uncovering government malpractices. 
These participatory public hearings typically take place in villages when strong 
indications point at a scam having taken place in a given government project, usually 
in the gram panchayat (the local government body at the village level). Scams take 
myriad forms of expressions, often ‘petty’ in nature yet always severe in their 
consequences on the poor. Embezzlement typically occurs on government 
sanctioned anti-poverty schemes and projects so that the failure to implement them 
correctly has grave implications on the poor. In this regard, claims against corruption 
in a jan sunwai are not made so much on moral grounds as on direct articulations of 
threats to livelihood.  
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 A typical jan sunwai setup is as follows: prior to the actual public hearing an 
audit team (comprised of civil society organizations and active members of the given 
village) obtains all documents and records relating to the development project in 
question through the filing of RTI applications. Records include muster (pay) rolls, 
cash books, expenditure vouchers, bills of material bought and project engineer 
measurement books. These findings are compiled into a legible form and then 
verified by the audit team by tracking down and interviewing all labourers and 
witnesses concerned on the accuracy of the documents. It is through this interactive 
process that villagers become involved in the uncovering of corruption and are 
animated to participate in the upcoming public hearing.  
 
 Once the relevant information has been gathered, the jan sunwai event is 
organised by the audit team under a pandal (a traditional, colourful marquee) in a 
visible location in the village, to which the entire village is invited by means of 
vibrant music, songs and puppets. With its somewhat 'festive' mood, jan sunwais are 
generally widely attended, not least by the local government officials.  
 
 During the jan sunwai proceeding a verification process with reference to the 
findings revealed by the audit team takes place again, yet this time in a public 
setting. Each labourer of the government work in question gives testimony and 
reveals publicly the inconsistency between the official documents and their own 
experiences. One by one the aggrieved villagers and any concerned witnesses are 
called forward to speak up. Typical cases include forged signatures on payment 
slips, enlisted workers who have long since died, claims of hiring tractors or camel-
carts from villagers who do not own such things, bogus entries of projects that do not 
exist in reality, exaggerated bills and vouchers of material.  
 
 What is noteworthy in all the accounts of corruption raised in a jan sunwai is 
that they refer to very local occurrences of misappropriation of funds that directly 
affect villagers’ livelihoods. With personal experiences of embezzlement as the 
starting point, villagers begin drawing on broader philosophical debates on 
corruption. Individual accounts of fraud are redefined in terms of injustice, where the 
denial of adequate government services is viewed as constituting an infringement 
into their rights as citizens. The act of publicly articulating a grievance is typically an 
indication of an awareness of ones entitlements and a consequent dissatisfaction with 
a denial hereof. Slogans cheered throughout a jan sunwai proceeding, such as ‘hum 
janenge, ham jiyenge’ (‘we will know, we will live’), or ‘hamara paisa, hamare 
hisab’ (‘our money, our accounts’) are direct calls for access to information and 
broader demands for openness and transparency. With these simple slogans, 
principles of governance are made locally tangible and meaningful. Participants of a 
jan sunwai seem all too aware of the importance of access to information for their 
struggle for social justice.  
 
 It is within the public and collective forum of a jan sunwai that the culprit 
official is held culpable. At the end of the cross-examination, the concerned local 
official is given the opportunity to explain his (occasionally her) actions, to counter 
allegations made, or even to admit wrongdoings. A panel of internal and external 
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experts – journalists, lawyers, academics or government officials – participate in the 
jan sunwai, assuming the role of the 'jury' or third-party guarantors. 
 
 The individual cases of petty-fraud that are articulated in a jan sunwai bring to 
expression the dissatisfaction with a faulty governance. The local officials, such as 
the sarpanch, being held to account for corruption become signifiers of ‘the state’ 
writ large. The sarpanch, typically a fellow villager embedded in the locality 
through ties of kinship, cannot evade in an illusive disguise, and thus becomes the 
direct contact to the sarkar (‘government’).  This personification of the government 
in the form of the sarpanch is the avenue through which people make their demands 
for accountability. It is at this local most level that notions of governance find 
expression. 
 
 Being informal in nature, the outcomes of a jan sunwai are not legally binding 
nor do they have direct de jure enforcing powers. However, the mere performance of 
the public inspection and collective scrutiny of the government works as conducted 
in a jan sunwai is a form of redress in itself. The public declaration of official 
wrongdoings, supported with the meticulous evidence presented in a jan sunwai 
leads, inter alia, to the shaming of the official in question. What makes this method 
particularly efficacious is that generally the government representative being held to 
account is the sarpanch (the elected village headman) who is typically from the area 
and thus cannot evade the public gaze. In other words, the corrupt sarpanch is not a 
faceless bureaucrat who can hide in an impersonal guise or in a rationalized 
bureaucratic structure, but is an individual whose reputation needs to be maintained 
in the eyes of kin, neighbours and peers. In many occasions, the proceedings of a jan 
sunwai has the consequence of a public apology or even a return of the embezzled 
funds.  
 
 Follow-ups of a jan sunwai also involve the writing of reports to relevant 
senior government officials with recommendations regarding action and policy 
considerations to improve delivery of governance. Pressure is enforced either by 
means of a petition to local officials or by involving the local or even national media. 
In some cases, the civil society groups involved in the jan sunwai process file a 
complaint of the frauds uncovered in a jan sunwai in the local courts. Thus, although 
jan sunwais do not have legal powers, they nevertheless act as a form of sanctioning 
and punishment forum by putting public pressure on the government to take 
corrective steps.  
 
Good governance and anti-corruption 
 Without question, the jan sunwai process represents a unique experiment in 
combating corruption that reflects the particular demands and needs of rural 
populations in Rajasthan. However, by expanding the analysis beyond the 
specificities and idiosyncrasies of a jan sunwai, connections to broader processes 
come to the surface. An examination of the good governance agendas reveals 
striking parallels to the village processes occurring in rural Rajasthan. Buzzwords 
circulating in the international development discourse include transparency, 
accountability and anti-corruption, and it is no coincidence that jan sunwais are 
concerned with precisely these concepts, even if not explicitly employing these 
      85 
terms in the course of the hearings. This case suggests that debates and discourses 
occurring at the transnational level come to be reflected in some form or the other at 
the local level.  
 
 Good governance is one of the central concerns in the contemporary 
development discourse. Although no clear definition of good governance exists, it is 
usually associated with ideals of the rule of law, participation, accountability, 
transparency, openness, effectiveness and efficiency. The conventional connotations 
of good governance are the efficient management of a nation’s resources and affairs 
by minimizing corruption and insuring participation of minorities in decision-
making processes. To accomplish this, good governance reforms comprise both 
economic and political principles based on models of liberal democracy that are 
targeted at the state, the private sector and civil society. If these institutions conform 
to market driven principles, it is argued by good governance proponents, they 
contribute to economic growth, and, consequently, to the development of the 
country. This position sustains the idea that liberal political democracy and a free 
market are mutually reinforcing (Currie 1996: 790).  
 
 The promotion of good governance agendas was buttressed through the 
collapse of socialism in the early 1990’s (Corbridge et al. 2005). In consequence, 
this failure of the state-controlled economy gave way to the advocacy of a politically 
unfettered market. With the World Bank at the forefront, the initial stages of the 
promotion of good governance saw the advancement of a set of structural adjustment 
programmes that aimed to free the market from the burdensome control of 
government. The role of the state was redefined as needing to work in the interest of 
the private sector and the market economy. Official bureaucrats, with their 
discretionary power, were blamed for being inefficient and motivated by self-interest 
and thus accountable for corrupt institutions.  
 
 Within the new orientation towards market-based governance, a thriving civil 
society, made up of active individual citizens, was conceived as a means of replacing 
inefficient politicians. The credo was that an active civil society could press for 
governmental accountability and thus raise efficiency and effectivity. Concurrently 
to the strengthening of a civil society whose intrinsic value-aspirations were market-
oriented, an incentive for decentralization follows suit in the agenda of good 
governance, with the similar intention of loosening centrally held government 
control.  
 
 India’s liberalization of its market in the early 1990’s marked a heightened 
point in the promotion of good governance agendas. Facing an economic crisis, 
various stabilization and structural adjustment plans were implemented to enliven 
the market. In 1991, the World Bank supported India’s economic policy reforms 
through a ‘structural adjustment operation’ (SAL) worth $500 million96. A range of 
conditions, in line with the Bank’s agenda, accompanied the SAL, including the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  From the World Bank’s website: 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/0586c
c45a28a2749852567f5005d8c89?OpenDocument&Click=  
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liberalization of trade by promoting export, abolishing import licensing and 
introducing cuts in subsidies. Beyond the Bank’s conditions-tied loans, the 
government of India introduced its own economic reforms with the incentive of 
‘slimming down’ the state and its welfare institutions by emphasising managerial 
forms of economic rationality and cost-benefit. Following the neoliberal model, it 
was held that allowing more autonomy to the private sector would reduce 
opportunities of corruption to state officials (Currie 1996: 798). This led 
subsequently to the proliferation of civil society and non-governmental organizations 
that were increasingly vested with responsibility and conceived of as ‘partners’ of 
the state.  
 
 Good governance, so it has been criticized, is promoted by global 
organizations such as the World Bank as a means of addressing the institutional 
contexts within which economic adjustment policies are to be implemented (see 
Kiely 1998). In other words, implementation of good governance principles provides 
the institutional shifts required for neoliberal pro-market intervention. Thus viewed, 
good governance and market liberalization go hand-in-hand. Neoliberalism as a 
doctrine has become so entrenched in contemporary life, that its purview extends 
well beyond the paradigms of the market and comes to be experienced in social and 
political spheres. Ong’s (2006) study of ‘neoliberalism as exception’ is particularly 
instructive in providing an expansion of the notion of neoliberalism. She focuses on 
the function of neoliberalism as a new “technology of governing” (2006: 4), and 
argues that the logic of the market penetrates into the political sphere, thus resulting 
in “a new mode of political optimization” (ibid: 3). Within this order, individuals are 
expected to regulate and discipline themselves according to standards of efficiency 
and competitiveness as demanded by the market and thereby come to replace some 
of the functions of the state. Neoliberalism, in other words, relies on self-reliant and 
self-managing individuals that constitute an efficient and effective citizenry. Ong 
concludes that neoliberalism constitutes a mode of governmentality whereby 
everyday conduct is managed and regulated so as to best serve the market. 
 
 Thus viewed, neoliberal governance advances by institutionalising social 
situations according to standards of effectiveness and efficiency. An example of such 
technological instruments designed for the implementation of transparency and 
accountability are audits. The practice of audits has become so widespread and 
ubiquitous in the current neoliberal order, that reference has been made to the ‘audit 
explosion’ (Power 1999) or to ‘audit cultures’ (Strathern 2000). Audits are being 
increasingly institutionalized in various spheres of life, whereby individuals are 
made to undergo formalized and technological standards of accountability. This 
results in ever-standardized forms of measuring performance and efficiency. Power 
(1999) explains this to be a result of a broader agenda of social organization and 
control that culminates in an “extreme case of checking gone wild” (1999: 14). 
Ultimately, institutionalized forms of audits conform to the neoliberal demands of 
managerial efficiency and effectivity. 
 
Good governance and jan sunwais 
 Having thus far outlined the central aspects of good governance and its 
correlation to neoliberal ideals, the question arises as to its applicability to the jan 
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sunwai context. Characteristics of agendas of good governance appear to be 
conspicuously present in the jan sunwai. Demands for transparency and 
accountability are the guiding objective and ambition of a jan sunwai process, 
whereby the proceedings are carried out by holding government officials to account. 
The state is portrayed as and attacked for being constituted by ineffective and corrupt 
bureaucrats who signify a failure in the state apparatus. It is through the jan sunwai 
model, in the form of social audits, that citizens take it upon themselves to correct 
state malpractices and to enforce ethical standards of governance. Citizens become 
principle actors in seeking appropriate enforcement of development projects that 
affect their lives, and, thus conceived, engage in models of participatory 
development. Citizens who engage in such processes must be responsible, 
managerial and effective in order to make demands of government officials. In sum, 
what we have here is an assemblage of all buzzwords of the agenda of good 
governance converging in the processes of a jan sunwai: transparency, 
accountability, participation, decentralization, responsible citizens and the practice of 
auditing.  
 
 In spite of these striking parallels between jan sunwais and agendas of good 
governance, it is questionable whether these anti-corruption public hearings in rural 
Rajasthan form part of a wider framework of neoliberalism. The characteristics 
drawn upon in the local contexts may bear resemblance to agendas as proclaimed by 
the World Bank and other major transnational organizations, but does this imply that 
they are guided by neoliberal ideals? What is it about transparency and 
accountability per se that is neoliberal? Surely the World Bank and other neoliberal 
institutions do not have supremacy over the definition of concepts such as 
transparency, accountability and participation so that these terms may have entirely 
different meanings and effects in the jan sunwai case. Or do processes of translation 
and dissemination take place, implying a continuum in meaning? If so, in which 
spaces does this translation occur and who are the actors involved? Some of these 
questions can be answered by examining, what I refer to here as the processes of 
vernacularization. 
 
Vernacularization of anti-corruption 
 In order to examine the link between neoliberalism and jan sunwais, I draw on 
Tsing's (2004) tour de force ethnography on global connections. Tsing's study 
provides a useful framework from which to identify the nexus of convergence 
between global and local phenomena and thus lends towards an explanation of how 
macro concepts are manifested and experienced at the micro level. Her work on 
environmental movements in Indonesia indicates that the global is always enmeshed 
in the particular, with both ends of the spectrum mutually constituting one another. 
Universal aspirations are not imposed as standardised abstractions, but rather, the 
universal comes to be “charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical 
encounters” (2004: 1). In other words, the proliferation of universal aspirations does 
not result in general global homogenization, but instead, through its encounters with 
the particular, it is transformed and reformulated in specific situations. Moreover, 
universals themselves come into being and are given substance precisely in the 
interactions with the culturally specific, resulting in always hybrid, transient and 
dialogical aspirations. These global connections bring about 'emergent cultural 
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forms' produced through processes of 'friction' that describe “the awkward, unequal, 
unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” (2004: 4). This 
approach urges for a conceptualization of the universal as an “aspiration, an always 
unfinished achievement, rather than the confirmation of a pre-formed law” (2004: 7).  
 
 Following on from Tsing, I suggest that jan sunwais can be read as a 
manifestation of a space of ‘friction’. They represent the global connections that 
emerge out of the encounter between the transnational promotion of neoliberal 
agendas of good governance and the specificities of needs and demands in rural 
Rajasthan. Neoliberalism as a concept does not exist in isolation from the practical 
encounters, whilst the local contexts, no matter how particular or idiosyncratic, are 
infused to some degree with neoliberal concepts. This indicates the workings of 
multiple and intersecting structures of power and meaning.  
 
 What this reading allows for is an examination of the processes of translation 
of global ideas and concepts as used in particular contexts, without reducing them to 
mere rhetoric or as products of top-down intervention. Instead, the creative 
interpretation and unique adaptation of the local experiences comes to the forefront. 
Although jan sunwais indicate apparent parallels to the contemporary global 
promotion of good governance, the notion of friction warns against a monolithic 
analysis hereof. Dialogues between the local, national and transnational spheres 
shape the experienced realities of good governance. It is through cultural dialogue in 
the spaces of friction that meaning arises. The culturally specific registers through 
which claims for good governance are being articulated against corrupt local 
officials in Rajasthan are an indication of the cultural dialogue through which 
universal aspirations are negotiated. 
 
 It is this cultural dialogue between universal aspirations and local articulations 
that I refer to as a process of vernacularization. Vernacularization, as applied here, 
implies the transformation, appropriation or adaptation of normative ideals into 
locally meaningful contexts. It involves the translation and dissemination of 
transnational ideas and concepts into local social settings. Paley (2002) characterizes 
this process of vernacularization as one in which local actors “strategically and 
selectively appropriate and transform transnationally circulating discourses, 
sometimes filling foreign words with their own meaning” (2002: 485). This indicates 
that exogenous terms are not enforced institutionally, but undergo processes of 
internalization and adaptation. For example, the vernacularization of democracy, as 
shown by Michelutti (2007), implies that ideas and practices of democracy come to 
be embedded in popular consciousness until they are “gradually moulded by folk 
understandings of ‘the political’” (2007: 642).  
 
 The events that unfold in a jan sunwai appear to be a result of processes of 
vernacularization. Notions of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption that 
prevail in the transnational discourses are found replicated in the jan sunwai process, 
yet as unique and distinct manifestations. Macro concepts are given a tangible and 
visible face, whereby local actors are actively involved in translating, appropriating 
and negotiating universal aspirations to suit the local contexts. In this way, anti-
corruption agendas are vernacularized as they materialise in specific locations.  
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